Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 46
Number 1 Fall 2012

Article 8

5-15-2013

Should they Stay or Should they Go: Can State Attorneys General
Avoid Removal of Parens Patriae Suits to Federal Court Under the
Class Action Fairness Act?
Michael Jaeger

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr

Recommended Citation
Michael Jaeger, Should they Stay or Should they Go: Can State Attorneys General Avoid Removal of
Parens Patriae Suits to Federal Court Under the Class Action Fairness Act?, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 327
(2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol46/iss1/8

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

SHOULD THEY STAY OR SHOULD THEY GO:
CAN STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AVOID
REMOVAL OF PARENS PATRIAE SUITS
TO FEDERAL COURT UNDER THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT?
Michael Jaeger*
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) allows a defendant to
remove a class action filed in state court to federal court if certain
requirements are met. There is currently a circuit split as to whether a
parens patriae suit—a suit brought by a state attorney general on behalf
of the citizens of the state—qualifies as a class action under CAFA. The
issue raises serious concerns about federalism and has significant
implications for civil procedure, and it could affect the ongoing suits by
states against mortgage lenders in the wake of the financial crisis. This
Note argues that the circuits that have declined to classify a traditional
parens patriae suit as a class action are correct, because they are in line
with both the intent of CAFA and longstanding jurisdictional and
federalism principles underlying removal. The Note suggests that
Congress craft a legislative solution to the split, using as a template an
amendment contemplated during CAFA's passage but ultimately not
included because it was believed—erroneously, it appears—not to be
necessary.

* J.D., December 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., May 1993, Yale
University. I owe a large debt of gratitude to Professor Georgene M. Vairo for her guidance,
editorial assistance, and enthusiastic support, and would also like to thank Scott Westhoff and the
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valuable advice. Thanks also to my parents and brother for their longstanding support over all of
these years, and most of all to my wife Linnea Pyne and daughters Molly and Sarah, who have
taught me and inspired me in ways I could never have imagined.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a classic courtroom battle: the crusading state attorney
general (AG) on one side, bringing suit to protect the citizens of her
state,1 and the multinational conglomerate on the other, defending its
right to zealously pursue commercial success. The conflict raises a
simple question: is the AG’s suit a class action? The answer is far
from simple, and the implications of that answer have serious
consequences. If a court decides the suit is not a class action, the AG
can stay in the friendly confines of state court. If the court finds
otherwise, however, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)2 allows
the company to remove the case to federal court, traditionally seen as
a much more defendant-friendly forum.3 This Note will examine the
current state of the federal judiciary’s interpretation of CAFA as it
applies to attempted removal of parens patriae suits brought by state
AGs.
The issue has wide-ranging implications for numerous aspects of
jurisdictional analysis, including diversity, real parties in interest,
plaintiff as master of the complaint, and piercing of pleadings, and
touches broader legal concepts like standing and statutory
interpretation. It also has serious consequences for federalism,
specifically the states’ ability to protect their citizens in the manner
they see fit. This last point has recently become a nationally
important issue, as states decide what actions they will and will not
take against five of the country’s largest banks in the wake of the
home-mortgage crisis.4 While the settlement involving forty-nine

1. Such an action is called a “parens patriae” suit. The Latin phrase “parens patriae”
literally means “parent of his or her country,” and the current doctrine is derived from the English
“royal prerogative,” the right and duty of the sovereign to act as guardian for those who could not
take care of themselves. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (9th ed. 2009); Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
2. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 617–18 (2006)
(describing plaintiff and defense attorneys’ preferences for state and federal court, respectively).
4. See, e.g., Consent Judgment at 5, United States v. Bank of Am., Corp., No. 12-cv-00361RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), 2012 WL 1440437, at *5.
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state AGs and the banks barred some suits by states, it left open
several alternate avenues of action.5 An uncertain jurisdictional
standard for the removal of state-brought parens patriae actions
could have a serious impact on whether state AGs bring such suits at
all, potentially delaying or preventing redress of wrongs done to
millions of homeowners nationwide.6
Part II presents and analyzes the current state of the law,
focusing on a circuit split: while the Fifth Circuit, the first to tackle
the problem, came down on the side of removal under CAFA,7 three
subsequent circuits have distinguished the case or disapproved the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, granting remand based on a lack of CAFA
jurisdiction.8 Part III critiques the existing law, primarily by
examining West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast,9 a district
court opinion that followed the Fifth Circuit’s approach. Finally, Part
5. State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five Largest Mortgage
Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://naag.org/state
-attorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largest-mortgage-servicers-on
-foreclosure-wrongs.php (last visited Sep. 22, 2012) (stating that the settlement “does not include
claims relating to securitizations of mortgage loans” and “release[s] the servicers only from
servicing, foreclosure and origination liability claims”).
6. The right of state attorneys general to bring and keep such suits—against out-of-state
defendants based exclusively on state law—in-state court is a crucial weapon in their arsenal,
both as an end in itself as well as a way to promote settlement. In addition to being a factor in the
home-mortgage settlement, see, for example, Jenifer B. McKim, State Sues Big US Lenders, BOS.
GLOBE, (Dec. 2, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-12-02/business/30468663_1_thousands
-of-foreclosure-documents-foreclosure-crisis-foreclosure-proceedings, suits by state attorneys
general helped lead to the $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement against the four leading
tobacco companies. See Utah Sues Tobacco Companies, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at A9. It is
important to note that those suits, and that settlement, occurred nearly ten years prior to the
passage of CAFA.
7. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Louisiana
v. AAA Ins. (In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches), 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008). Since this Note
was submitted for publication, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue again, in Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012). The court used a different provision
of CAFA in its analysis than it did in Caldwell (a provision that is beyond the scope of this
article), but it used the same “claim-by-claim” reasoning (see infra Part II.C.1.b.i) to arrive at the
same ultimate conclusion that removal was proper. Id. at 803. The State of Mississippi has
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, invoking the circuit split. Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Case No. 12-1036 (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed Feb. 19,
2013).
8. Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2011); LG Display Co. v.
Madigan, 665 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2011); West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 646
F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011). Since this Note was submitted for
publication, the Second Circuit has concurred with these three circuits on the issue. See Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2013).
9. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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IV proposes that Congress craft a legislative solution to settle the
issue, using as a template an amendment contemplated but ultimately
voted down during the lead-up to CAFA’s passage.
II. STATEMENT AND
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING LAW
A. The Class Action Fairness Act
On February 18, 2005—not even a month after he had been
sworn in at his second inaugural10—President George W. Bush
signed into law the Class Action Fairness Act.11 Its proponents had
first introduced a similar bill in May of 1998 and had done so in
every subsequent session of Congress.12 Each time, the bill either did
not make it out of committee, failed in a floor vote, or was
filibustered.13 However, after the reelection of President Bush and
the strengthening of the Republican majorities in the House and
Senate in the fall 2004 elections,14 the stage was set for the
Republicans to introduce and finally pass CAFA.15
Its sponsors moved quickly. CAFA was introduced in the Senate
on January 25, 2005, passed the Senate on February 10, passed the
House a week later, and was signed into law by the President the
next day.16 The broad intent of CAFA’s proponents was “[t]o amend
the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions
to assure fairer outcomes for class members and defendants, and for
other purposes.”17 They also sought to “restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal

10. Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush, at 2nd Inaugural, Says Spread of
Liberty Is the ‘Calling of Our Time,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A1.
11. Scott L. Nelson, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: An Analysis, 2005 ABA
ANNUAL MEETING, SECTION OF LITIGATION, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT: REFORM OR
REVOLUTION? 1, (Aug. 4–7, 2005), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/aba_cafa_analysis.pdf.
12. S. 12, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 353, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R.
1875, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998).
13. Nelson, supra note 11; Anna Andreeva, Note, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The
Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 386–88 (2005).
14. Carl Hulse, Republicans Add 4 Seats in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1.
15. Nelson, supra note 11.
16. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 79 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 73.
17. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, Preamble, 119 Stat. 4.
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court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction . . . .”18
On its face, this goal, expressed by CAFA’s removal provisions,
is laudable: to make sure class actions with implications beyond a
single state are decided by a federal court. Some commentators,
however, have stated that the stated goal concealed a secondary aim:
to make it easier for corporate defendants to escape the purportedly
more plaintiff-friendly confines of state court for the federal
judiciary, which is believed to be more favorable to defendants.19
To expand federal jurisdiction, CAFA added an extensive
subsection to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the diversity statute, and a wholly
new section, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, regarding removal of class actions.20
Among many other changes, the most significant for AG-brought
parens patriae cases were the elimination of the longstanding
judicial requirement of complete diversity in favor of minimal
diversity21 and a provision granting class action defendants the right
to remove suits brought in defendants’ states of citizenship (which is
otherwise barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)22).23 Given the
overwhelming likelihood that one of the plaintiffs in a class action
will be from a different state than one of the defendants, virtually any
class action of any significance would meet CAFA’s relaxed
diversity requirement.24 Class action plaintiffs could also no longer

18. Id. § 2(b)(2).
19. See, e.g., GEORGENE M. VAIRO, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: THE COMPLETE CAFA:
ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 5 (2011)
(“Defendants had long complained about the economic pressure that class actions place on
them . . . . One solution . . . was to give [them] a free pass out of the state courts, and CAFA was
specifically designed to do just that.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1528–29 (2008).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006).
21. Complete diversity occurs when “all plaintiffs have different citizenship from all
defendants.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (9th ed. 2009). Minimal diversity simply requires
one plaintiff and one defendant to be citizens of different states. See id.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Other changes included the following: (i) the amount in
controversy requirement for class actions was set at $5,000,000 (§ 1453); (ii) a single defendant
could file for removal (§ 1441(a) had traditionally been interpreted to require all defendants to
join the filing); and (iii) the one-year statute of limitations on removal was eliminated (28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (2006)).
24. See VAIRO, supra note 19, at 52 (“This ‘minimal diversity’ requirement of CAFA is
generally not an issue because it is so easily satisfied.”).

Fall 2012]

SHOULD THEY STAY

333

avoid removal simply by bringing suit in one defendant’s “home
state.”25
Finally, crucial to the analysis of CAFA’s application in the
state AG-suit context is CAFA’s definition of a class action. Section
1332(d)(1)(B) states, “[T]he term ‘class action’ means any civil
action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
[“Rule 23”] or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action.”26 CAFA’s coverage is not limited to class
actions per se, however; it also applies to “mass action[s],” described
as “any civil action [that is not a class action] in which monetary
relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly
on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions
of law or fact . . . .”27 The mass action provision also contains an
exception for claims brought on behalf of the general public under a
state statute specifically permitting such claims.28 Such an action
would not be subject to CAFA.
B. Parens Patriae Suits
In the United States, parens patriae has developed into a
doctrine of state standing, giving states the right to bring suit on
behalf of their citizens when a “quasi-sovereign” interest is at
stake.29 While “quasi-sovereign” interest has never been specifically
defined, courts have recognized at least two quasi-sovereign
interests: the state’s interest in the general economic and physical
well-being of its citizens, and its interest in not being denied rights
given to all states under the federal system.30 The cases discussed in
this Note fall under the first of these two.
25. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 26 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26 (“Under
current law, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers can easily manipulate their pleadings to ensure that their
cases remain at the state level”); VAIRO, supra note 19, at 170.
26. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
27. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The action must also meet CAFA’s amount in controversy
requirement of $5 million. See VAIRO, supra note 19, at 6.
28. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
29. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600–01, 607
(1982).
30. See id. at 601–08. Courts have also often attempted to define “quasi-sovereign” by
noting what it is not. It is not a sovereign interest, involving power over entities within the state’s
jurisdiction or a demand for recognition from other sovereigns in border disputes; it is not a
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C. The Circuit Split
In 2008, the Fifth Circuit heard the first two cases to reach the
circuit level involving removal of suits brought by state AGs,
deciding in favor of removal in both cases.31 The Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits reached the opposite result in 2011.32 At least one
district court has followed the Fifth Circuit,33 although most have
agreed with the Fourth.34
1. Did CAFA Fundamentally Change Removal?
The Fifth Circuit Cases
a. Louisiana v. AAA Insurance
(In re Canal Litigation Breaches)
In Louisiana v. AAA Insurance,35 the state’s AG filed suit
against numerous insurance companies, alleging that they had
breached insurance contracts by failing to pay certain claims in the
aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.36 The state initially filed
suit on its own behalf, because many of the affected homeowners had
taken payment directly from the state in return for assigning their
claims to the state.37 The AG then amended the suit, adding a class
action claim under a Louisiana state statute and naming as the class

proprietary interest, such as ownership of land; and it is not a private individual or entity’s
interest being pursued only nominally by the state. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309, 335–36 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
31. Louisiana v. AAA Ins. (In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches), 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir.
2008); Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
32. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharm. Inc., 646 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011); LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2011);
Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2011).
33. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
34. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (E.D. La. 2012)
(distinguishing both Caldwell and Comcast and granting remand based on a “plain meaning”
reading of the language of CAFA); South Carolina v. LG Display Co., No. 3:11-cv-00729-JFA,
2011 WL 4344074 (D.S.C. Sep. 14, 2011); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C071827 SI, 2011 WL 560593 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (making the same distinction as that found
in In re Vioxx, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 664); Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (distinguishing the Caldwell majority and following
the dissent).
35. AAA, 524 F.3d at 700.
36. Id. at 702.
37. Id. at 702, 703.
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the same homeowners who had executed subrogation agreements.38
The defendants removed the case to federal court under CAFA, and
Louisiana requested remand, claiming that CAFA did not apply.39
The district court denied Louisiana’s motion.40
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, based on two rationales. First, the
court determined that the case fell under CAFA’s definition of a
class action.41 Louisiana attempted to argue that a state is not a
person, which would exempt the suit from CAFA’s language (“an
action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class
action”). The court reasoned, however, that CAFA required only that
the suit be brought under a statute authorizing class actions by a
person, which this suit had been; it did not require that the suit
actually be brought by a person.42 Second, the court found that the
group of plaintiffs met CAFA’s requirement of minimal diversity.43
Louisiana relied on the longstanding judicial rule that a state is not a
citizen for diversity purposes,44 arguing that there was no citizen
plaintiff for a defendant to be diverse from.45 The court agreed that a
state is not a citizen under diversity statutes but concluded that the
assignments of the insurance claims and the joinder of the citizens as
class action plaintiffs made the citizens real parties in interest in
addition to the state, thereby meeting the minimal diversity
requirement.46
Louisiana also attempted to claim sovereign immunity from
involuntary removal, as a state suing defendants that it was
authorized to regulate in state court under state law.47 The court
discussed cases declining to grant states immunity in similar
38. Id. at 703. The state statute was Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 591(A), the
state’s class action statute, which essentially mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the
federal class action statute (which sets out the bedrock class action requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation). FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Louisiana’s rule,
however, adds that the class also must be able to be “defined objectively in terms of ascertainable
criteria.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591 (1997).
39. AAA, 524 F.3d at 704.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 705.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 706.
44. See, e.g., Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).
45. AAA, 524 F.3d at 706.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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situations, when the state was the plaintiff rather than a defendant,
but ultimately made the decision on the narrow ground that even if
the state was immune, its immunity did not extend to the individual
citizens it had added to the suit.48 The court noted that to extend a
state’s immunity to its citizens would be “in frustration of a
congressional decision to give access to federal district courts to
defendants exposed to these private claims . . . .”49
Thus the two crucial factors in AAA were that the AG had sued
under the state’s specific class action statute and that he had added
specific citizens as plaintiffs.50 Although the AG took a different
approach in the second Fifth Circuit case, Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell
v. Allstate Insurance Co., decided only three months after AAA, the
end result was the same.51
b. Louisiana ex rel.
Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co.
Louisiana sued a number of insurance companies and the
management consulting firm McKinsey & Company for “work[ing]
together to form a ‘combination’ that illegally suppressed
competition in the insurance and related industries.”52 Unlike in
AAA, however, the AG brought the suit parens patriae, on behalf of
the state’s citizens, without joining any individual citizen plaintiffs.53
He also filed suit under the Louisiana Monopolies Act, not
Louisiana’s version of Rule 23.54
The defendants removed, Louisiana filed for remand, and the
district court judge denied the state’s motion, piercing the pleadings
to find that the state was only a nominal party and the citizen

48. Id. at 707–11.
49. Id. at 711 & n.47 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005)) (stating that, as noted in the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s report, CAFA “is intended to expand substantially federal court
jurisdiction over class actions,” and “[i]ts provisions should be read broadly, with a strong
preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by
any defendant.”). This rationale, and its source, will become a significant issue in subsequent
cases.
50. See id. at 706–12.
51. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
52. Id. at 422.
53. Id. at 421–22.
54. Id. at 423.
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policyholders were the real parties in interest, giving minimal
diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.55
i. The majority’s
“claim-by-claim” approach
In a 2–1 decision, the majority affirmed the district court’s
decision and upheld the removal.56 It used congressional intent, a
real-party-in-interest analysis of the parens patriae suit, and the AAA
analysis of the sovereign immunity issue to find that the case came
within CAFA’s jurisdiction.57
The majority first noted that the Senate Committee Report
accompanying CAFA stated that “the definition of ‘class action’ is to
be interpreted liberally. . . . [L]awsuits that resemble a purported
class action should be considered class actions for the purpose of
applying these provisions.”58 The majority also observed that
Congress considered but rejected an amendment that would have
exempted class actions brought by states.59
The court then used this apparent intent behind CAFA’s broad
grant of jurisdiction, combined with three cases in which courts
disapproved of plaintiffs’ “fraud,” “ill-practice,” and “devices” used
to “improperly creat[e] or destroy[] diversity jurisdiction,” to justify
piercing the pleadings and looking beyond “the labels that the parties
[may] attach.”60 The majority carefully examined the state’s parens
patriae suit to determine whether the alleged quasi-sovereign interest
55. Id. at 423. The circuit court’s opinion does not discuss the district court judge’s
determination regarding how the suit met the CAFA definition of class action, i.e. pursuant to
Rule 23 or the state equivalent.
56. Id. at 432. Judge Southwick filed a strong dissent, however, which will be discussed
below. See infra Part II.C.1.b.ii.
57. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 423–32.
58. Id. at 424 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005)). As will be discussed below,
however, the Committee Report was not published until ten days after the passage of the bill,
calling into question its value as a source of Congressional intent. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 79
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 73.
59. Id. at 424 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S1157, 1163–64 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005)). In a
footnote, the court acknowledges that some Senators apparently rejected the amendment not
because they opposed it, but because they saw it as unnecessary. The court does nothing further
with this information. Id. at n.4.
60. Id. (quoting Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1995); Grassi v. CibaGeigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1990); Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204
U.S. 176, 185–86 (1907)).
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was sufficient to make Louisiana a real party in interest, as opposed
to simply a nominal party bringing a private suit.61
Significantly, the court split up the claims, looking particularly
at an antitrust claim for treble damages.62 The court concluded that
the policyholders, not the state, were the real parties in interest, for
three reasons: (1) language in the state statute allowed individuals to
recover treble damages; (2) repeated references in Louisiana’s filings
made it clear that it was asserting damages to individuals, not the
state as a whole; and (3) the jurisprudence had established that “the
purpose of antitrust treble damages provisions are [sic] to encourage
private lawsuits by aggrieved individuals.”63 Having so determined,
the court affirmed that CAFA properly applied: with the onehundred-plus policyholders, not the state, as real parties in interest,
the case now qualified under CAFA’s definition as a “mass action.”64
By splitting the claims and focusing on an antitrust claim benefitting
a few to the exclusion of a claim for injunctive relief benefitting
many, the court was able to find grounds for removal under CAFA.65
ii. The dissent’s
“whole complaint” approach
Judge Southwick’s dissent in Caldwell has been frequently cited
by subsequent courts that reached the opposite result.66
As a threshold matter, he did not share the majority’s belief that
CAFA fundamentally changes the nature of removal analysis. He
commenced with the concept that the plaintiff remains master of the
complaint: any ambiguities or contested issues are still to be resolved
against the party seeking removal.67 He also pointed out that one of
61. Id. at 428; see also supra note 30 (describing courts’ efforts to define a quasi-sovereign
interest).
62. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 429.
63. Id. at 429–30 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 262 (1972)).
64. Id. at 430; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2006) (describing CAFA’s mass
action provisions); supra text accompanying notes 26–28 (same).
65. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 429–30.
66. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Ass’n, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 942,
945, 946 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (“This Court also does not find the legal analysis in the Caldwell
majority opinion to be persuasive . . . . [T]he Court finds [the dissent] better reasoned and
persuasive.”).
67. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 433 (Southwick, J., dissenting) (quoting Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d
234, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2007); see also 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 23.63(2)(c) (3d ed. 2012) (stating same).
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the cases the majority had cited to justify piercing the pleadings,
Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, states that federal jurisdiction cannot be
defeated by a “disguise.”68 But because there was no indication that
the AG had used “fraud” or “ill-practice” in bringing the suit, as was
found in the cases the majority cited,69 Judge Southwick found no
“disguise” and saw no reason to justify reversing the longstanding
presumption in favor of remand.70
He also differed from the majority on the proper method of
analysis, maintaining that the court “should determine what the case
is, not what it must be if all the relief requested is to be part of the
litigation.”71 Rather than focusing on one claim, for treble
damages—which might not even end up being awarded—and finding
it sufficient to remove the entire case, the court should assess the
action as a whole as it stands at the moment of removal and
determine whether it meets CAFA’s requirements.72 This distinction
between “whole complaint” and “claim-by-claim” analysis will
govern the outcome in most cases of this kind.
To that end, Judge Southwick moved on to the language of
CAFA. He stated that the case at hand simply did not fit into any of
the statutory definitions of actions removable under CAFA and,
further, that the majority had essentially found the AG’s pleading
defective and cured it sua sponte in such a way as to make it fit under
CAFA.73
This was not a class action for CAFA purposes, Judge
Southwick reasoned, because it was not brought pursuant to
Louisiana’s Rule 23 equivalent, as CAFA’s definition required, nor
did the statute under which the AG actually brought suit, the
Louisiana Monopolies Act, recognize the AG as a “Rule 23 class
representative every time he seeks to enforce [it].”74 Similarly, the
suit could not be made into a CAFA mass action “simply because the
removing party suggests that the best way to cure a defective
68. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 433 (Southwick, J., dissenting) (quoting Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy,
Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)).
69. See supra text accompanying note 60.
70. See Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 433 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 434–35.
73. Id. at 433–35.
74. Id. at 434–35 & n.1.
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pleading is to join 100 additional parties.”75 Instead, if the
determination was that the AG could not bring the treble-damages
claim parens patriae, then the pleading simply would be defective
and the case should have been remanded for further “procedural
work in state court.”76
Finally, Judge Southwick expressed some prudential concerns
on the issue of federalism.77 First, he stated that the majority put the
cart before the horse when it found jurisdiction by effectively
amending (or requiring amendment of) the pleadings, pointing out
that “[t]his is the wrong court for forcing such discretionary choices
because the only source of our jurisdiction is CAFA.”78 In effect,
Judge Southwick argued, the majority requested a change in the
pleadings to give it jurisdiction at a moment in time when it did not
yet have that jurisdiction to do so.
Second, he reasoned that the crucial issue—whether the case, or
at least certain claims within it, must in fact be brought as class or
mass actions—“is primarily a function of state law. The authoritative
judicial interpreters of that issue are all in Louisiana state courts.”79
Moreover, by abolishing the one-year statute of limitations on
removal in class actions,80 CAFA obviated the risk that the
defendants’ removal would be time-barred; thus there was “no
reason to rush questions of state law into the federal courts.”81
2. Removal’s Fundamentals Have Not Changed:
The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Cases
The issue did not appear in the circuit courts again until 2011,
when the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits heard appeals of

75. Id. at 435. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 1998) (asserting that a court “should not force
the parties to try an action as a class suit when they prefer to litigate in their individual
capacities”).
76. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 434–35 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 435–36.
78. Id. at 435.
79. Id.
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b), 1453(b) (2006).
81. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 435–36 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
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remand orders of attempted removal of state AG actions under
CAFA.82
a. Creation of the Split:
West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
In West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,83 West
Virginia’s AG sued six pharmacies in state court, claiming that they
had sold generic drugs to West Virginia citizens without passing
along the cost savings associated with using generics instead of
brand-name drugs.84 The AG alleged this violated at least two state
statutes, West Virginia Code § 30-5-12b(g), which regulates
pharmacies, and § 46A-6-104, the West Virginia Consumer Credit
Protection Act (WVCCPA).85 West Virginia brought the suit parens
patriae and sought injunctive relief as well as specific financial relief
and restitution on behalf of the affected consumers.86 The defendants
removed the case under CAFA, but the district court remanded,
finding that the case was indeed a parens patriae action as opposed
to a class or mass action and thus was not removable under CAFA.87
The Fourth Circuit majority saw the case as “a straightforward
statutory analysis of CAFA.”88 The action was clearly not brought
pursuant to either Rule 23 or West Virginia’s equivalent class action
statute, so the statute the AG was in fact suing under would have to
have been sufficiently “similar” to Rule 23 to allow federal
jurisdiction per CAFA’s definition of a removable class action.89 The
way in which it must be similar is by “authorizing an action to be
brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.”90 The
court thus concluded that while a similar statute need not be
identical, it must require the essential characteristic elements of a
82. See supra note 32. After this Note was submitted for publication, the Second Circuit also
considered this issue and, like the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, granted remand for lack of
CAFA jurisdiction. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2013).
83. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 646 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2011).
Interestingly, as in Caldwell, the court was divided 2–1. Id. at 171.
84. Id. at 171–72.
85. Id. at 172.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 174.
89. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (setting out the federal jurisdictional requirements
for a class action).
90. CVS, 646 F.3d at 174 (emphasis added) (quoting § 1332(d)(1)(B)).
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class action: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.91
Applying that reasoning to the case at bar, the majority found
that the two relevant West Virginia statutes had “virtually none” of
the required class action elements.92 Its reasoning is illustrated by its
responses to two objections raised in the dissent, and those responses
rebut the Fifth Circuit as well. To the claim that any action in which
one individual purports to represent a larger group is similar enough
to a class action,93 the majority responded that “[a]ll class actions are
representative in nature; but not all representative actions are
necessarily class actions.”94 What sets class actions apart from other
representative actions, the court continued, is the requirement that
the representative party have a claim that is typical of the rest of the
class. Here, the AG’s interest was not the same as that of the affected
citizens.95
The dissent, like the Fifth Circuit, also disputed the AG’s quasisovereign interest, saying that it was not a sufficient nonprivate
interest because some of the disgorged profits would flow to
individuals as opposed to either the state or all of its citizens.96 The
majority dismissed this concern, stating that even if it had not
determined the case to be parens patriae, the central question was
whether the action met the CAFA definition of a class action, parens
patriae or not, and the court found that it had not.97 Furthermore, the
court cited multiple cases in which courts, including the Supreme
Court, had found that even when a figure like an AG was asserting
some claims on behalf of individuals, the action was not a class
action.98

91. See id. at 174–75.
92. Id. at 175–76.
93. Id. at 179 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 175 n.1 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at 175 n.1, 176 (citing the Supreme Court’s statement that the representative party in
a class action “must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’
as the class members” (citations omitted)).
96. Id. at 176 n.2.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 177; see, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. Equal Emp’t. Opportunity
Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 334 & n.16 (1980); In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1306, 1310–13 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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The majority also addressed the defendants’ assertion, raised
previously in Caldwell,99 that their position was supported by
CAFA’s legislative history.100 The court identified two critical
problems with that argument. First, the Committee Report stating
that CAFA’s removal provisions should be construed broadly was
issued ten days after CAFA became law.101 It is thus a questionable
expression of Congress’s intent at best, according to simple logic as
well as the Supreme Court: “[P]ost hoc statements of a congressional
Committee are not entitled to much weight.”102 Second, the court
cast doubt on the probative value of certain CAFA floor statements
the defendants relied on, citing two contrary statements made by the
same senator on the same page of the Congressional Record.103
Finally, just as Judge Southwick had done in his Caldwell
dissent, the majority closed with its concerns about federalism.104
Removal here, it wrote, would “risk trampling on the sovereign
dignity of the State and inappropriately transforming what is
essentially a West Virginia matter into a federal case.”105 The
majority reinforced this assertion by comparing it to the relevant
purpose stated in CAFA: this case was in no way “an ‘interstate case
of national importance,’ the defining federal interest animating
CAFA’s removal provisions.”106 Instead of analyzing whether the
state’s sovereign immunity was transferable to citizens, as the Fifth
Circuit did in both of its cases, the majority recognized the
federalism risks inherent in removal and reminded federal courts that
they should be “most reluctant to compel such removal, reserving
[their] constitutional supremacy only for when removal serves an
overriding federal interest.”107
99. See supra text accompanying note 58.
100. CVS, 646 F.3d at 177.
101. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 109–14 (2005).
102. CVS, 646 F.3d at 177 (quoting Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982)).
103. Id. (“Compare 151 CONG. REC. S1163 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Charles Grassley that a subsequently defeated amendment intended to exempt suits brought by
state attorneys general would have ‘create[d] a very serious loophole’), with id. (statement of Sen.
Charles Grassley that ‘the amendment [was] not necessary’ because ‘cases brought by State
attorneys general will not be affected by this bill’).”).
104. Id. at 178.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2 § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4,
5 (2005)).
107. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 266–67 (1880)).
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b. Following the Fourth:
Washington State and California
ex rel. Harris v. Chimei Innolux Corp.
In a Ninth Circuit case, the AGs of Washington and California
sued the manufacturers of certain types of LCD screens, alleging a
price-fixing conspiracy.108 Both states sued parens patriae in state
court, seeking various types of relief, including an injunction, civil
penalties, restitution, and treble damages for some claims.109 As in
the previous cases, the defendants removed under CAFA and the
states opposed.110 The district court, which heard the consolidated
cases, granted remand, and the defendants appealed.111
The Ninth Circuit set the tone for its analysis by noting that “the
general principles of removal jurisdiction apply in CAFA cases. The
right of removal is statutory, and the requirements strictly construed.
The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in CAFA
cases, lies with the defendant seeking removal.”112 The Ninth Circuit
thus agreed with the Fourth Circuit that CAFA did not change the
presumptions underlying removal, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis.113
The court found that the actions were valid parens patriae suits,
given that each state used a state statute that authorized it to bring
suit on behalf of its citizens.114 To assess whether such suits come
under CAFA, the court employed statutory construction and came to
a quick and simple conclusion: “There is no ambiguity in CAFA’s
definition of class action.”115 Such an action must be brought under a
state statute or rule similar to Rule 23 that authorizes an action as a
class action,116 and none of the state laws the AGs used to bring their

108. Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2011).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 847 (citation omitted) (citing Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d
676, 685, 686 (9th Cir. 2006)).
113. Cf. VAIRO, supra note 19, at 88–89 (“After significant litigation on the burden of
proving CAFA jurisdiction issue [sic], the courts have rejected the argument that Congress
intended courts to shift the jurisdictional burden to the opponent of federal jurisdiction.”).
114. Chimei, 659 F.3d at 847 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080(1) (2007); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16760(a)(1) (West 2002)).
115. Id. at 847–48.
116. Id. at 848.
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suits were their states’ Rule 23 analogs.117 Furthermore, none
required the fundamental class action elements the Fourth Circuit felt
would have been necessary to transform a parens patriae–pleaded
case into a class action.118
The defendants tried to broaden the statutory interpretation,
emphasizing the word “similar” in the definition of a removable class
action.119 They, like the Fifth Circuit, cited the Senate Committee
Report’s instructions “to interpret the definition of class action
‘liberally’ under CAFA,” because they wanted to minimize what is
required in a state statute to show similarity to Rule 23.120 The
court’s response was twofold: First, regardless of how flexibly one
defines “similar,” CAFA’s definition states that the statute being
sued under must also authorize the action to be brought as a class
action.121 A statute should be construed to give meaning to all words
and phrases in the statute; had Congress not wanted to require that
second element, it would not have added it.122 None of the state
statutes that Washington and California used to bring suit authorize
AG suits as class actions; thus, the court concluded, regardless of
similarity between a particular parens patriae action and a class
action, without the required authorization in the state statute, the
requisite CAFA “class action” definition could not be met.123
Secondly, just as the Fourth Circuit had done, the Ninth took
issue with the probative value of legislative-history evidence on
CAFA, undermining one of the Fifth Circuit’s key reasons justifying
parens patriae removal.124 In a footnote, the court pointed out that
the Senate Committee Report contains a quote that “contradicts the

117. Id.
118. Id.; see supra note 91 and text accompanying.
119. Chimei, 659 F.3d at 849; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006).
120. Chimei, 659 F.3d at 849 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 35 (2005) (“[CAFA’s]
application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labeled ‘class actions’ by the named
plaintiff or the state rulemaking authority.”)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 849–50; see also TRW v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“We are ‘reluctant to
treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting’ . . . .”).
123. Chimei, 659 F.3d at 849–50.
124. See id. at 850 & n.3.
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Report’s later statement that CAFA applies to all lawsuits that simply
resemble class actions.”125
Finally, the court acknowledged AAA and Caldwell, but
distinguished rather than refuted them, explaining in a footnote that
AAA involved an action filed under the state’s Rule 23 equivalent
and that Caldwell did not decide the issue.126 It should be noted,
however, that the court’s brief mention of Caldwell could be termed
somewhat formalistic, in that it claims that Caldwell did not decide
whether a parens patriae action brought under state law was a class
action under CAFA. The Caldwell majority found that particular
parens patriae action to only be “styled” as such, disguising its true
nature as a “mass action” qualifying for removal under CAFA.127
Saying that the Fifth Circuit did not decide whether parens patriae
actions were removable class actions under CAFA seems to be
splitting hairs, since one could argue that the spirit of the Fifth
Circuit’s decision was that any parens patriae action was indeed
vulnerable to CAFA removal, even if it was not brought pursuant to
the state’s class action statute.
c. Reinforcing Claim-by-Claim:
LG Display Co., v. Madigan
LG Display Co. v. Madigan, a Seventh Circuit case, is the most
recent circuit court decision on the issue as of this writing. The case
involved Illinois’s allegations of price inflation on LCD products
sold to the state, its agencies, and its residents.128 The Illinois AG
brought suit against multiple manufacturers under the Illinois
Antitrust Act (IAA), the defendants removed under CAFA, and

125. Id. at 850 n.3 (citing S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29 (2005) “[CAFA] defines the term ‘class
action’ to include representative actions filed in federal district court under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as actions filed under similar rules in state courts that have been
removed to federal court.”). The court interpreted this to tie the definition to the degree of
similarity between the state statute being used to bring suit and Rule 23, as opposed to the
definition proposed by the defendants, which attempted to broaden CAFA’s application to cases
beyond those labeled as class actions or brought specifically under Rule 23/state class action
statutes. Id. at 850.
126. Id. at 849 n.2.
127. Lousianna ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2008).
128. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Illinois filed for remand, which the district court granted; the
defendants then filed for leave to appeal.129
The defendants here had a slight advantage over the defendants
in CVS and Chimei: the state statute the AG used, the IAA, says, “no
person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of
this State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this Act, with
the sole exception of this State’s Attorney General, who may
maintain an action parens patriae.”130 The court’s opinion notes that
the defendants used this language to argue that the Illinois legislature
saw a parens patriae suit under the IAA as a form of class action.131
This would seem to satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s requirement, at least,
that the state statute being used to bring suit authorized the suit to be
brought as a class action.132 While the defendants did make this
argument,133 they were unable to use the Ninth Circuit’s language in
their favor, as that decision came down after they filed a leave to
appeal.134
The court made fairly short work of the defendants’ arguments,
based on the now-familiar criteria in the CAFA class action
definition:135 the plaintiff must use Rule 23 or a state equivalent,
which was not done here; a “representative person” must bring the
suit, but the AG is not a class representative; the suit must be brought
as a class action, and this was a parens patriae suit; and if not a
named class action, the suit must be sufficiently similar, and the IAA
does not require a suit brought under its authority to have those
characteristics deemed essential to a class action (adequacy,
numerosity, commonality, and typicality).136
129. Id. It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit, unlike the Fourth and Ninth, rendered its
decision on the leave to appeal, not the appeal itself, stating that if the case was not in fact a class
or mass action under CAFA, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the full
appeal. Id.
130. Id. at 771–72 (quoting 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/7 (2010)).
131. Id. I would tend to agree. See also Notice of Removal at , Illinois v. AU Optronics, No.
10-cv-05720 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 3624970 (asserting that “[t]he IAA itself makes
clear that a parens patriae suit is a class action in all but name . . . .”).
132. See supra text accompanying note 121.
133. See Notice of Removal, supra note 131 at 6–7.
134. The defendants in LG Display, 665 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2011), submitted their Petition for
Leave to Appeal Remand on July 18, 2011; the opinion in Chimei, 659 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir.
2011), was issued on Oct. 3, 2011.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006).
136. LG Display, 665 F.3d at 772.
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The court also summarily dismissed the defendants’ alternative
argument that the suit was a CAFA “mass action,”137 which requires
joinder of 100 or more persons’ similar claims. The court’s reasoning
was simple: the AG was the only person making any claims, making
the mass action provision inapplicable.138 In addition, however, the
Seventh Circuit was the first to point out a relevant mass action
exception buried in CAFA at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III),
which states that a suit is not a mass action if “all of the claims in the
action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf
of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to
a State statute specifically authorizing such action.”139 If an AG
sought to stop economic malfeasance in her state for the benefit of all
consumers in that state via a parens patriae suit, that would clearly
seem to fit within the exception.140
The Seventh Circuit was also the first circuit to adopt Judge
Southwick’s “whole complaint” analytical framework.141 The
defendants wanted the court to look behind the pleadings to “what’s
really going on,”142 but they acknowledged that such an argument
relied on separating the claims and only then determining the real
parties in interest for each.143 The defendants cited Caldwell,
discussed above, and the district court decision West Virginia ex rel.
McGraw v. Comcast Corp.,144 which will be discussed below, as
authority for the claim-by-claim analysis.
The court rejected the claim-by-claim approach for two primary
reasons. First, three recent district court decisions on CAFA had
specifically disapproved of the approach,145 and an older Supreme
137. Id.; see § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (“[M]onetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of
law or fact . . . .”).
138. LG Display, 665 F.3d at 772.
139. Id.; see § 1332 (d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
140. See LG Display, 665 F.3d at 772 (“By the plain language of that provision, too, this case
is not a mass action.”).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
142. LG Display, 665 F.3d at 772.
143. Id. at 772–74.
144. 705 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
145. LG Display, 665 F.3d at 773 (citing In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C
07-1827 2011, WL 560593, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (declining to take the claim-by-claim
approach because (1) there is no language in CAFA to support such an analysis, and (2) there is
no sign of congressional intent that CAFA should extend to parens patriae actions); Missouri ex
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Court decision had set forth the proper real-party-in-interest
analysis.146 Second, because there is no basis for the claim-by-claim
approach in the language of CAFA, the court disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation that the congressional intent to broaden
federal jurisdiction over class actions allowed a divergence from the
“traditional ‘whole complaint’ analysis.”147 It cited a district court
opinion that could not have been more definitive: “Neither
[Comcast] nor Caldwell cites any language in CAFA to support a
claim-by-claim approach to evaluating the real party in the interest
[sic] in a parens patriae case. There is no such language in
CAFA . . . .”148
Finally, as both Judge Southwick and the Fourth Circuit had
done, the Seventh Circuit expressed its concerns about the federalism
conflicts raised by CAFA. It saw no reason to change the
presumption against removal that exists due to “sovereignty
concerns,”149 as articulated by the Supreme Court: “considerations of
comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought
from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.”150
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
This Note has pointed out many of the problematic elements of
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning throughout Section II. An analysis of
the decision of the one court that has followed Caldwell—the Eastern
rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945–46 (E.D. Mo. 2010)
(stating that piercing the pleadings to do a claim-by-claim analysis is appropriate only when
fraudulent joinder has been alleged); Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1050–53
(C.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that the state is a real party in interest in the action as a whole, regardless
of potential individual citizen beneficiaries of certain claims, if it has “a substantial stake in the
outcome of the case”) (citations omitted)).
146. Id. (citing an earlier decision of its own, Nuclear Eng’g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241 (7th
Cir. 1981), which quotes Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (a state’s
status as the real party in interest “is a question to be determined from the ‘essential nature and
effect of the proceeding.’”)).
147. Id. at 773–74 (quoting In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-1827, 2011
WL 560593, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011)).
148. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-1827 2011, WL 560593, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011).
149. LG Display, 665 F.3d at 774.
150. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 n.22 (1983); see
also LG Display, 665 F.3d at 774 (“Restraint is particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme
Court’s directive that removal statutes should be ‘strictly construed’ . . . .” (quoting Syngenta
Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002))).
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District of Pennsylvania, in West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v.
Comcast151—is an excellent lens through which to examine the flaws
and dangers in that reasoning, which could explain why other courts
have been reluctant to follow in the Fifth Circuit’s footsteps.
In Comcast, West Virginia’s AG brought an antitrust and
consumer protection suit under several state laws—none of which
were the state’s equivalent of Rule 23—against Comcast for
requiring certain customers to rent its proprietary cable box.152
Comcast removed, and the state filed for remand.153
A. The Approach:
Whole Complaint vs. Claim-by-Claim
To assess whether the complaint met CAFA’s requirement of
minimal diversity, the judge used a real-party-in-interest analysis of
the state’s parens patriae suit, just as the Fifth Circuit had done in
Caldwell.154 If the state was “only” trying to protect its citizens, the
district court judge reasoned, it had asserted a proper quasi-sovereign
interest in their economic and physical health and well-being, per
Snapp,155 and was therefore the real party in interest.156 If, however,
West Virginia was “also” bringing claims involving private
individuals, those individuals were real parties in interest, thereby
meeting CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement.157
Analyzing the claims in this way is a hallmark of the claim-byclaim analysis. The Comcast judge asserted that courts are split (in
both pre-CAFA and non-CAFA cases) on the issue of whether a state
can remain the sole real party in interest in a parens patriae suit
when it is bringing treble- or compensatory-damages claims in
addition to claims for injunctive relief.158 Other courts, however,

151. 705 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
152. Id. at 443–44.
153. Id. at 444.
154. It is well established that a state is not a citizen for purposes of diversity. See Minnesota
v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 63 (1904).
155. See supra text accompanying note 30.
156. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 447; see Hood v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 639 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2009) (using
the claim-by-claim approach to find state has no quasi-sovereign interest with such a combination
of claims). Contra Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (using the
whole-complaint approach to find the opposite with a similar combination of claims).
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have said that rather than the equipoise that a “split” implies, most
courts in fact fall on one side of the issue and only a few on the
other.159 Rather than assessing the claims individually, the large
majority of courts examine the case as a whole by looking at all of
the claims collectively, asking “not whether the state alone will
benefit, but whether the state has ‘a substantial stake in the outcome
of the case.’”160 Similarly, many courts have held that adding
individual damages claims to more broad-based state claims does not
“automatically render[]” a state a nominal party.161
There are at least five reasons compelling the use of the “whole
complaint” method of analysis. The first is simply the fundamental
concept of what is judicially reviewable in federal courts according
to the Constitution: “Cases” and “Controversies” are the words used
in Article III, Section 2, not “claims.”162 Thus in assessing whether
federal jurisdiction exists, the Framers appear to have intended courts
to examine the action as a whole (the controversy) rather than any
one specific claim. Congress demonstrated its agreement with this
concept in the codification of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, which allows courts to exercise jurisdiction over additional
claims when those claims “form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”163 In other
words, claims are not to be treated independently; they are to be
examined in the context of how they relate to the larger case or
controversy at issue.
Second, to treat the claims individually destroys the plaintiff’s
long-standing and oft-acknowledged right to be “master of the
complaint” and choose the forum.164 While CAFA’s Senate

159. See, e.g., Illinois v. AU Optronics Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(collecting multiple authorities asserting that “most” courts have rejected the claim-by-claim
approach and instead viewed the complaint as a whole); Ohio v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 760 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 745–46 (N.D. Oh. 2011).
160. AU Optronics, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (quoting SDS W. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1052)
(emphasis supplied).
161. Id. at 853.
162. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority . . .—to Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State . . . .”).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
164. AU Optronics, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
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Committee Report—the value of which, as has been discussed, is
questionable165—has text which could be taken to suggest a more
liberal approach to removal, there is certainly no text indicating a
reversal of the power of forum selection. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
explicitly so stated: “a plaintiff, as master of the complaint, may
include (or omit) claims or parties in order to determine the
forum.”166
Third, the Fifth Circuit’s rationale appears to be a solution in
search of a problem: it would be a rare case in which a state AG
fraudulently manipulated the rules of pleading to disguise the nature
of her suit, particularly when she was bringing the action under a
state statute specifically authorizing the suit. In the context of class
action removal under CAFA, in fact, no such case exists. One court
disapproved of the Fifth Circuit’s approach for just this reason,
saying that “the Fifth Circuit relied on cases involving fraudulent
joinder or fraudulent pleading to justify ‘piercing’ the plaintiffs’
pleadings . . . despite the fact that it does not appear defendants had
alleged that the plaintiffs used fraud to destroy federal
jurisdiction . . . .”167
Fourth, even if one were to examine claims separately, there is
ample precedent for finding that the “individualized” damages
sought by the state that so troubled the Caldwell and Comcast
courts—the treble and compensatory damages tied to particular
individuals’ losses—would have a sufficient statewide deterrent
effect on the defendants and other commercial actors in the state as
to qualify as a quasi-sovereign interest.168 The court in Illinois v. SDS

165. See supra text accompanying note 102. The Comcast judge seemed to acknowledge this,
saying in a footnote, “CAFA’s legislative history is extremely limited,” noting that there is no
House or Conference report due to how quickly it went through Congress. West Virginia ex rel.
McGraw v. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). Given the paucity of
the record and the speed of CAFA’s passage, a single Committee report may not be an accurate
indicator of “Congress’s” intent.
166. Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 2010).
167. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945–46
(E.D. Mo. 2010).
168. See Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Pennsylvania v.
Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribs., Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 132 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] state can have a
legitimate public interest in ensuring the economic well-being of its citizens—and in indirectly
promoting a smoothly functioning economy freed of antitrust violations—even though the most
obvious beneficiaries may be individual consumers who ultimately recoup money damages.”).
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West169 put it simply: “[S]ecuring an honest marketplace is a quasisovereign interest.”170
Fifth, concerns about federalism are a final reason why the
claim-by-claim approach in parens patriae CAFA removal situations
is improper. The Comcast judge asserted that such an approach is
“most consistent with Congress’s intent under CAFA to expand
federal jurisdiction over class actions . . . with interstate
ramifications.”171 However, as many of the courts supporting remand
have noted, these cases are brought in state court by state AGs under
state laws designed to protect the citizens of that state; the
inapplicability of the phrase “interstate ramifications” is clear.
This approach thus leaps from an undeniable congressional
intent to expand federal jurisdiction—expressed in the law’s
preamble as “to restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction”172—to a disregard of three fundamental jurisdictional
principles: the longstanding federalism-based presumption against
removal, the Supreme Court’s command to construe all removal
statutes strictly, and the respect always accorded the plaintiff as
master of the complaint. The approach then appears to go even
further, to an analytical piercing of the pleadings and a breaking up
of the complaint in situations in which there was no indication that
the parties were trying to disguise anything.
B. The Substance:
Statutory Interpretation
and Congressional Intent
In addition to these numerous flaws in the method of the
Caldwell/Comcast analysis, the substance and rationales of the
analysis are similarly troubling.
First, both courts strained the interpretation of a key word in
CAFA’s definition of “class action.” The Comcast judge, following
169. 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
170. Id. at 1051.
171. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48 (citing S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 35 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34).
172. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5
(emphasis added).
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the lead of the defendants in Chimei,173 attempted to broaden the
definition of the word “similar” in the phrase “similar to Rule 23.”174
The Fourth Circuit’s test for similarity in CVS is taken straight from
the statute: a similar state statute would “authoriz[e] an action to be
brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.”175
Judge Brody, however, found that “[t]he primary objective of a class
action suit . . . has always been to protect the interest of ‘absentees,’
i.e. unnamed class members.”176 She then noted a few provisions in
the WVAA having to do with notice, opt-out, and adequacy of
representation, and found that those elements make the WVAA
sufficiently similar to Rule 23.177
Not only is this at odds with the language of CAFA, but the
underlying rationale is arguable: Is absentee-interest protection truly
the “primary” objective of class actions? The Supreme Court case
offered as support for that assertion does not in fact say so; instead, it
simply cites protecting absentees’ interests as one of the
“justifications that led to the development of the class action”178—
not the justification, and not an objective; just one of several
justifications. As noted earlier, a fairer statement of the federal class
action prerequisites sets out four qualities: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation.179 These elements, as the
CVS court said, are what a statute similar to Rule 23 must require
(not least because they are codified in Rule 23).180 Notice and opt-out
provisions are clearly of secondary importance, and they do not
define class actions per se, as the Comcast judge would have it.
Such an interpretation is also strained because it ignores the
dictates of plain language in the analysis of the relevant state statute.
CAFA’s provision is straightforward: a federal court has jurisdiction
when the plaintiff has used Rule 23 or a “similar state statute or rule
173. See generally supra text accompanying notes 115–117 for a discussion of the criteria
used to determine whether a suit comes under CAFA.
174. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 452–54.
175. West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS, 646 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B)); see generally supra text accompanying notes 90–91.
176. Comcast, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
177. Id. at 452–54.
178. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402–03 (1980).
179. See supra notes 91, 136; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (9th ed. 2009)
(detailing the four prerequisites of a class action).
180. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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of judicial procedure . . . .”181 The most logical interpretation of this
language is that it applies to actions filed under state class action
statutes (in other words, Rule 23 equivalents), not consumerprotection actions, which are separately authorized under any
number of state laws. It stretches the boundaries of the word
“similar” beyond any plain-language definition to say that, for
instance, the South Carolina Antitrust Act,182 or the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act,183 or the West Virginia Pharmacy
Act,184 is as sufficiently similar to Rule 23 as are those states’ classaction statutes or rules.185
A second problematic substantive element is Caldwell’s and
Comcast’s use of CAFA’s legislative history as a rationale for
weakening the presumptions against removal and justifying piercing
the pleadings. The rushed, scarce, and post hoc nature of CAFA’s
legislative history has already been discussed several times above.
The first federal court to tackle the CAFA parens patriae removal
issue, the District of New Jersey in Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc.,
delved extensively into CAFA’s legislative history, finding
persuasive such statements as “[AG suits] are not class actions;
rather, they are very unique attorney general lawsuits authorized
under State constitutions or under statutes. . . . [T]his amendment is
not necessary . . . because our bill will not affect those lawsuits.”186 It
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006).
182. See South Carolina v. LG Display Co., No. 3:11-cv-00729, 2011 WL 4344074, at *1
(D.S.C. Sep. 14, 2011) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-180 (1976)).
183. See Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 942, 943
(E.D. Mo. 2010) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 407.010 (1986)).
184. See West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS, 646 F.3d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing W.
VA. CODE § 30-5-12b (2007)).
185. See S. C. R. CIV. P. 23; MO. R. CIV. P. 52.08; W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23.
186. Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 753 (D.N.J. 2005) (quoting 151 CONG.
REC. S1157-02, at S1163 (statement of Sen. Grassley)). The court found another similarly
definitive statement from a supporter of the bill:
[T]his amendment . . . is unnecessary . . . . [L]et me be perfectly clear that [attorney
general parens patriae suits] are not class actions . . . . Section 1332(d) in no way
affects these lawsuits . . . . [T]he bill applies only to class actions, and not parens
patriae actions. Class actions being those lawsuits filed in Federal district court under
rule 23 of the Federal rules of civil procedure or lawsuits brought in State court as a
class action. Neither of these conditions are met when compared to the nature of a
parens patriae action, and consequently, are excluded from the reach of this bill.
151 CONG. REC. 1811 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Connecticut v. Moody’s Corp.,
664 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Harvey, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 752–54) (stating
that CAFA does not apply to state enforcement actions).
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can be argued, of course, that floor statements are of dubious value;
but given the extensive problems with the CAFA record already
cited, any purported congressional intent is clearly ambiguous and
certainly not sufficient to justify undermining jurisprudential
doctrines of long standing.
The Ninth Circuit found an additional reason to discount the
record. In Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical,187 the court stated that in
order to look to CAFA’s legislative history to determine who bore
the burden of proof on removal, an ambiguity in CAFA’s statutory
language was “at least a necessary condition.”188 Without any
language at all in CAFA regarding the burden, the court relied on the
bedrock presumption that “Congress is aware of the legal context in
which it is legislating” and therefore found that Congress had no
intention of effecting a major jurisprudential change such as shifting
the burden on removal via silence.189
IV. PROPOSAL
For all of the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the
appropriate choice for a jurist faced with a CAFA removal request in
a parens patriae suit is to remand the action to state court. As stated
in Part I, the recent mortgage crisis has brought state quasi-sovereign
interests into current legal discussions, and it is likely such interests
will continue to arise.190 This fact necessitates a clear validation of
the idea that state AG parens patriae suits are exempt from removal
under CAFA.
The most definitive way to provide this validation would be for
Congress to amend CAFA to specifically exempt parens patriae
suits from removal under the statute. As discussed in Part II, this was
attempted during the bill’s passage but was unsuccessful, largely due
to many senators believing that it was unnecessary.191 There was also
a procedural concern: the bill’s proponents wanted to speed its
passage by voting on identical bills, without amendments, in both

187. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006).
188. Id. at 683–84.
189. Id.
190. The effects of global warming provide another good example of a state quasi-sovereign
interest likely to be litigated in the future. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
191. See supra note 59.
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houses.192 Finally, there was a belief that the amendment, which
exempted “any civil action brought by, or on behalf of, any attorney
general,”193 would create a loophole for private lawyers to keep class
actions in state court simply by adding the AG as a plaintiff.194
With a slight adjustment to the language, legislators could
propose a very similar amendment today to prevent any future courts
from misinterpreting the language and intent of CAFA as the
Caldwell and Comcast courts did. As to the concerns expressed by
the opponents in 2005, a new amendment would address each. First,
given the actions of some courts, there can no longer be any serious
doubt that the amendment is necessary. Second, as long as the
amendment is passed by itself and not attached to a larger bill, the
procedural concern would be moot. Finally, to address the alleged
loophole, the amendment could exempt solely “parens patriae
actions brought by any state attorney general.” This would give each
side some, but not all, of what it wants. On the one hand, the
amendment’s proponents would get an exemption, but not for any
suit brought by or on behalf of an AG; if an AG wanted to be sure to
avoid removal, she would have to bring the case herself rather than
contract with outside counsel to do so.195 On the other hand, wouldbe opponents of the amendment would compromise by voting for an
amendment that had been limited to address some of their concerns.
There are additional jurisprudential reasons, beyond the narrow
focus of AG parens patriae cases, why Congress should act. At the
most basic level, there is nothing in the text or even legislative
history of CAFA to indicate that it was intended to reverse the many
longstanding jurisdictional principles at issue in these cases, as
Caldwell and Comcast would have it: (1) the presumption against
removal, with resolution of ambiguities in favor of remand; (2) the
burden of justifying removal resting where it always has, on the
defendant; (3) the determination of the real parties in interest based
on the complaint as a whole, not by each individual claim; (4) the
192. 151 CONG. REC. 1808 (2005) (statement of Sen. Carper).
193. 151 CONG. REC. 1804–05 (2005).
194. 151 CONG. REC. 1808 (2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
195. An AG could still hire outside counsel to bring the suit; there would simply be a risk on
removal of running into a judge who followed Caldwell. The AG would thus need to assess that
risk against the importance of the case staying in state court and allocate her resources
accordingly.
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plaintiff as master of the complaint, in the absence of fraudulent
pleading or joinder; and (5) the fundamental principles of federalism,
which should allow state AGs to bring suit on behalf of their citizens
as authorized by their state’s laws and in the best manner they see fit,
and which allow federal courts to yank these otherwise state-bound
causes of action out of state court only on the rarest of occasions,
when the justification for doing so is unquestionable and in line with
CAFA’s purpose (“interstate cases of national importance”196).
To allow the opposite to happen would do double damage: First,
it would weaken core judicial principles, not just in CAFA removal
cases, by rolling back concepts that have developed over years to
protect smaller plaintiffs against larger defendants. Second, state
parties involved in or contemplating such suits would think twice
about taking the time and expense to bring an action if removal were
to become so simple; this would seriously weaken the protection that
AGs can offer their citizens via the valuable and unique remedy of
parens patriae suits.
It is also important that Congress act sooner rather than later.
While the trend is in the right direction, there are signs in a few of
the cases cited that had one thing been different—say, that an AG
was attempting to vindicate the rights of particular individuals as
well as the citizenry as a whole, or was pursuing a remedy that
individuals could also pursue themselves—the court’s decision might
have gone the other way.197
V. CONCLUSION
Will the classic courtroom battle that commenced this Note have
a happy ending for the state AG? She is a state employee bringing
suit in state court under state law to protect the citizens of her state
from alleged illegal actions in that state. Those facts alone present a
compelling case for allowing her to remain right where she is. A
United States statute would have to have quite an explicit grant of
196. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5.
197. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 667 (E.D. La. 2012)
(distinguishing cases which found that the state was not a real party in interest by relying on the
fact that the Attorney General was pursuing a cause of action that only he could enforce); In re
Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 591, 602–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the proremand outcome might have been different had the Attorney General been seeking anything other
than injunctive relief and damages paid directly to the state).
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jurisdiction in such circumstances to overcome federalism concerns;
CAFA’s language is not so express. CAFA’s actual provisions—not
its contradictory legislative history—would similarly need to clearly
state Congress’s intent to reverse the decades-old presumptions that
removal ambiguities should be resolved in favor of remand and that
the plaintiff is master of the complaint. Again, such definitiveness is
lacking. Finally, no less a document than the Constitution states that
federal jurisdiction is determined by cases or controversies, not
claims.
Had lawmakers not been in such a rush in January and February
of 2005, they might have seen the issue’s importance and clarified
CAFA’s language, thereby avoiding the ensuing judicial confusion.
The fix is simple, and even—a rare occurrence these days—arguably
bipartisan. Indeed, forty-six state attorneys general from both major
political parties supported the amendment then.198 Even in our
legislatively gridlocked times, perhaps it is not too much to hope for
that such a small but vital measure as this could squeak through,
benefitting attorneys general and, more importantly, their
constituents in every state.

198. 151 CONG. REC. 1805 (2005) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
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